

## ON KENNEDY TEAM NOW Frank Pace, Truman Ex-Aide

Frank Pace, Jr.—a top official in the Truman Administration—will be seen around Washington often again. President Kennedy picked him to be a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, which Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor heads.


Mr. Pace is a native of Little Rock, Ark. A graduate of Princeton and of Harvard, he is a lawyer with a head for figures and a flair for cutting bureaucratic tangles.

After wartime service in the Army Air Force, he went to work for the then Attorney General Tom Clark as a tax-law specialist.

Mr. Pace served in the Post Office Department and the Budget Bureau and, at the age of 36, was named Director of the Budget. Shortly before the outbreak of the Korean War, President Truman named Mr. Pace Secretary of the Army.

In private business since the end of the Truman Administration, Mr. Pace now is chairman of General Dynamics Corporation, one of the nation's biggest defense contractors.

Mr. Pace's new Government post is advisory and part-time. Several Washingtonians note that Frank Pace is already experienced in politics and government administration, at the end of 1957.



—General Dynamics Corp.

**FRANK PACE, JR.**

Serving the Government again

President Eisenhower's appointment of a most distinguished Board of Consultants to act as "watchdog" on the country's intelligence activities—which in turn are the watchdog of America—will be warmly welcomed. This action constitutes no reflection on the work of the Central Intelligence Agency which, under Mr. Allen Dulles, is the principal organization for obtaining and co-ordinating information essential to the nation's security. It is, rather, a response to the growing awareness of the supreme importance, in the light of modern weapons, of early and accurate knowledge of any potential enemy's capabilities and probable intentions.

Until World War II, the United States habitually relied on improvisation and makeshift for military intelligence. Sometimes it was brilliant, as in the decoding apparatus—the "black chamber"—established in the wake of World War I. More often it was inept; the overestimate of Lee's army by the Pinkerton detectives, who supplied intelligence to General McClellan in the Peninsular campaign and contributed much to the failure of the Union armies, is an historic instance. So, too, more recently, was the misreading of available data on Japanese intentions before Pearl Harbor.

Meanwhile, European nations had been building up intelligence and espionage organizations through centuries of competition, like Britain's celebrated M. I. 5. Russia, after the Bolshevik Revolution, turned the whole vast network of Communist organizations into similar activities, along with subversion and trouble-making generally. The United States, having tested the possibilities of large-scale intelligence work with Gen. William J. Donovan's Office of Strategic Services in World War II, set up the Central Intelligence Agency in 1947 to co-ordinate and evaluate the findings of the intelligence branches of the armed forces, the State Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and similar groups, and to undertake its own researches.

In its relatively short life, the C. I. A. has won commendation from several investigatory bodies, such as the Hoover Commission, whose task force, headed by Gen. Mark Clark, found that "we have made progress" in this important field. But the task force was also "deeply concerned over the lack of intelligence from behind the Iron Curtain," and warned that "we must not labor under any complacent delusions."

Since World War II, the United States has in fact been surprised too many times by Soviet advances in military technology. The Russians touched off an atomic explosion in 1949, two or three years at least before it was expected by American planners. Then, while the United States worked toward the hydrogen bomb, and consoled itself with the thought that the Russians might take years to overtake our scientific lead, the Soviet Union evidently concentrated on this new and most terrible weapon. At any rate, in 1953 Malenkov said: "The United States no longer has a monopoly on the hydrogen bomb."

By this time, there should have been an end to the downgrading of Russian technology and science by Americans. The MiG-15 jet fighter had provided a shock in Korea; the National Science Foundation had already pointed to the fact that Russia was producing engineering graduates at a rate that would soon outstrip the United States by more than three to one. Yet the delusion persisted in many quarters that the Russians might not have the capability to produce a bomb, and that in any case

the American capability for delivering atomic and hydrogen missiles far exceeded that of the Soviet Union.

This has since been dispelled. The appearance of the Soviet "Bison," an intercontinental bomber comparable to the American B-52, and of the "Badger," resembling the medium B-47, was first regarded as a display of "hand-made prototypes." But they are both known to be in mass production, and American assembly lines have been stepped up accordingly. The rapid development of the two Russian types, along with the new day and night fighters, the "Farmer" and "Flashlight," have made it plain that the race for the means of carrying devastating bombs by plane, and for countering similar thrusts by the enemy, is painfully close.

What is even more dangerous is the broad hint from Marshal Bulganin about "rocket weapons which have been recently developed into weapons of intercontinental power." This, of course, suggests that grim "ultimate weapon"—the intercontinental ballistic missile, which would rise to a height of 600 miles, then carry its atomic or hydrogen warhead toward its target, 5,000 miles from the firing point, at a speed of ten or fifteen times the speed of sound. Even in theory, there is as yet no conceivable defense against such a weapon; the only practical deterrent against its use would be the certainty of retaliation in kind.

The United States has several projects under way to achieve the I. B. M. So, too, obviously, has Russia. For a variety of technical reasons, it appears that the Soviet Union has not yet discharged such a missile in tests, but which nation is closer to the goal is a great global question mark. For if there is any perceptible lag between Russian attainment of the objective and similar success by the United States, there would not only be the danger of a devastating attack by the Kremlin but the acute possibility that Russia would use its advantage for international blackmail on a huge scale.

Hence it is urgent that the United States establish its intelligence agencies at peak efficiency—as well as press forward missiles development in high gear. Moreover, it is extremely important that the intelligence data accumulated be evaluated soundly, and without the excessive conservatism that has marred similar appraisals in the past. There have always been men and agencies to warn against overoptimism. General Donovan pointed to the Russian atomic threat as early as 1945; Mr. Dulles and Admiral Strauss did the same in respect to hydrogen bomb developments. The Killian report, issued by a committee headed by the man who is now chairman of the new Board of Consultants on intelligence, analyzed Russian capability of delivering atomic and hydrogen bombs by plane or missile. The National Science Foundation, a year ago, said there was a "national danger of underestimating the strength of the Soviet Union."

Common sense demands that the United States strive to the utmost to prevent the balance of nuclear power from being tilted against the free world by developing the whole family of new weapons now being studied and tested—the Navaho, the Snark, the Atlas, the Redstone and the rest, as well as conventional planes. Experience dictates that when there is doubt whether Russia has or has not made some particular advance in this field, to resolve the doubt in its favor. It is better to be prepared to counter an overestimated idea of the enemy's power than to learn too late, in

WASHINGTON POST & TIMES HERALD  
(Approx.) 15 January 1956**Watchdog for CIA**

The independent review board appointed by President Eisenhower to survey intelligence activities can perform a highly important function. This is not a reflection on the hard work of dedicated men and women in the Central Intelligence Agency. No agency of government, not even a secret intelligence operation, ought to be insulated from the checks and balances of outside security. CIA, with its thousands of employees, is a potent influence on national policy as well as an essential factor in national security. It has had some degree of high-level supervision from the National Security Council and the congressional Armed Services subcommittees. But apart from occasional surveys such as that conducted by the Hoover Commission—which recommended the appointment of a select watchdog group of private citizens—there has been no detailed study of day-to-day intelligence performance.

The eight-member board is composed of men of unusually high caliber. It is headed by James R. Kilian Jr., president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and includes such other distinguished members as former Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett and Lt. Gen. James H. Doolittle. The board will have no mandate to interfere in operations, but it should insure a broad check on the effectiveness of both CIA and the military intelligence agencies whose reports CIA evaluates. It should be in a position to report not only on deficiencies in the intelligence picture, but also on the degree to which CIA's overt and covert activities serve the national interest.

No doubt the creation of this board and the enlargement of the House Armed Services Subcommittee were in part intended to fend off passage of Sen. Mansfield's bill for a joint congressional committee on central intelligence. Some CIA officials have been skeptical of the Mansfield proposal bill because of the difficulty of insuring that members would not attempt to direct operations or blab secrets. Perhaps the new arrangements will serve somewhat the same purpose as a congressional committee, though in this newspaper's opinion a more specific legislative link would pay dividends if a satisfactory formula could be found. At any rate, the principle of a continuing outside check on intelligence is important, and the appointment of

the new board is noted by this newspaper.

15 January 1956

**Watchdog of the C. I. A.****An Evaluation of the President's Action  
In Naming Board to Review Intelligence**

By HANSON W. BALDWIN

The President's appointment last week of an eight-man board to review periodically the nation's intelligence activities is a step in the right direction. But unfortunately it does not go far enough.

The establishment of the citizen's commission was approved by Allen W. Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The action will be interpreted on one hand as an attempt to head off the establishment of a Congressional watchdog committee on the intelligence agency. On the other hand it lends tacit support to frequent and repeated criticisms of our intelligence services, particularly of the C. I. A.

The recent Hoover Commission report on intelligence activities recommended the establishment of a permanent bipartisan commission on intelligence. But it suggested a different form from that announced last week.

The Hoover Commission urged the inclusion of "members of both houses of the Congress and other public-spirited citizens" empowered by law to demand and receive any information it needed for its own use.

The President's board has no Congressional members. Although it has executive authority for support it does not have the legal authority that Congressional enactment could give. In other words it is not powerful enough, or broad enough, or will it have sufficient

Arthur G. Trudeau, Assistant Chief of Staff of the Army for Intelligence, was relieved after Mr. Dulles had sent a long and detailed bill of complaints against General Trudeau to the Pentagon.

A great many other incidents also suggest that all is not well with our intelligence establishment.

It can only profit from the new committee. But it could profit more from a permanent Congressional watchdog committee. If war is too important to be left to the generals, it should be clear that intelligence is too important to be left unsupervised.

Nevertheless, the experience and character of the eight appointees, who include Robert A. Lovett, former Secretary of Defense, give promise that the board will, in fact, as the President suggested, "make a real contribution to the task of Government." It is well fitted to take a fresh outside look at intelligence, even though it has no authority and will be able merely to suggest and advise rather than to control and supervise.

But there have been so many intelligence failures, so much friction and such sharp criticism, particularly of the C. I. A., that the appointment of the citizens board should not preclude the establishment of a continuing and permanent Congressional watchdog committee.

Such a committee could act, in the same manner as the Joint Congressional Atomic Energy Committee, as purse-watcher, supervisor, guardian, sponsor and defender of the C. I. A. It could give a constant and more thorough supervision to our intelligence activities than could any periodic check.

The two committees, working together, would be mutually supporting. They should insure as far as human checks and balances can do, a proper support for, and control of, our powerful intelligence organizations. This, the citizen committee alone cannot do.

The need for such support and control should be obvious. As the President said, "prompt and accurate intelligence is essential to the policy-making branches of Government." But it is more than that. It could mean national life or death in the atomic age.

On the other hand, uncontrolled secret intelligence agencies are in a position to dominate policy making, and hence Government. Their very secrecy gives them power; there are few to accept or reject their findings. Their "facts" do not pass through the sieve of Congressional debate or public inquiry. Few, even in the executive branch, know what they do.

The C. I. A., for instance, by the very breadth of its charter, is beyond the normal checks and balances of the law. An over-powerful secret intelligence agency is dangerous, not alone to the formulation of sound policy, but to the viability of democratic institutions.

**Record Is Spotty**

The intelligence record of the nation and of the Central Intelligence Agency in particular is spotty. There have been notable successes but also notable failures. The Hoover Commission's public critique was politely critical of some of our shortcomings.

The secret report of the same Hoover Commission task force on intelligence is far more critical.

Lieut. Gen. James H. Doolittle, a member of the President's new board, investigated C. I. A. and other intelligence activities in Germany a year ago and found much overlapping and ineffect-